MANUAL OF PANORAMA OF BATTLE OF SHILOH, CHICAGO.

Hughes & Johnson Lith. Chicago.

GEN. GRANT AND STAFF.

"The battle still continued without cessation, our forces being gradually forced back at all points, though fighting heroically. Two hours rolled around, and no news from Gen. Lew Wallace, when, at 2:30 P.M., Gen. Grant directed me to go in search of him, report to him how matters stood, and hasten him forward. I asked Capt. Rawlins to accompany me," etc., etc.—REPORT OF LIEUT.-COL., AFTERWARD MAJ.-GEN. MCPHERSON

Maj Rowley Col McPherson Gen Buell GEN GRANT Col Dickey Col Fry Col Webster

MANUAL OF THE PANORAMA

OF THE

BATTLE OF SHILOH

MICHIGAN AVENUE,

BETWEEN MADISON AND MONROE STREETS

CHICAGO.

CHICAGO:
A. T. ANDREAS, PUBLISHER, 602 OPERA HOUSE.
1885.

Hospital
Howell Farm
Cotton Gin
Battle commenced here at 5.14 A.M.
Gen. McDowell's Headquarters
Shiloh Church
Gen. Sherman's Headquarters
Sea Field
Red Field
Review Field
Hawk's Nest
Hickenlooper Battery
Gen. Prentiss Headquarters
Myers' Battery abandoned
Peach Orchard Field
Gen. Johnston killed
Gen. Stuart's Headquarters
Timbered
Timbered
Timbered
Creek
Lick
Spring
Landing
Corinth
Road
Pittsburg
Purdy
Ridge
Creek

F8346
S55
M294

MAP OF THE
BATTLE FIELD OF SHILOH,

FROM SURVEYS MADE FOR

THE SHILOH PANORAMA CO., CHICAGO,

—BY—

F. J. McINTOSH, C. E., 1884.

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
LEGEND
Lines at 7.30 A. M.
" " Noon.
" " Sundown.
Regimental Camps.
Timber.
MILES 3
MILES 2 1/2
MILES 2
MILES 1 1/2
MILE
Bridge
Mill
Creek
Ford
Spring
Old Town House
Gen. Prentiss' Headquarters
Gen. McClernand's Headquarters
Gen. Sherman's Headquarters
Gen. Hurlbut's Headquarters
Gen. McArthur's Brigade Camps
Tilman
Gen. McArthur's Headquarters
Gen. Hardee's Headquarters
Gen. Hurlbut's Camp
Gen. Wallace's Headquarters
Gen. Prentiss' Camp
Gen. Hurlbut's Camp
Gen. Wallace killed at 2 P.M.
Surrendered Here
Williams' Battery
Camp of Iowa
Yeatchs Farm
Camp
Camp Swenck
Gen. Hurlbut's Headquarters
McCLERNAND'S DIVISION
SHERMAN'S DIVISION
HAMMOND'S BRIGADE
STUART'S BRIGADE
TUTTLE'S BRIGADE
SWEENY'S BRIGADE
HILDEBRAND'S BRIGADE
Hamonds
Spring
Brigade Camp
Old Log House
Shade
Creek
Shade Creek
Bridge
Water Battery
Gen. Hardee's Headquarters
Gen. Wallace's Headquarters
Gen. Wallace's Camp
Gen. Hurlbut's Camp
Gen. Hurlbut's Headquarters

WEBER PIANOS.

For upward of thirty years these Superb Instruments have been conspicuously before the public upon the concert stage and in the drawing-room, and have maintained a reputation for DURABILITY that has never been equalled. No one has ever seen a worn-out Weber Piano of any description, the workmanship and materials employed in construction being of that superlative excellence that gives to these Instruments a time-defying quality unapproached in any other.

WEBER MUSIC HALL,

Wabash Ave. and Jackson St.,

CHICAGO.

"THE HORNET'S NEST."

The Thermopylæ of modern times, was the "Hornet's Nest" of Shiloh. Here, for eight hours, less than two thousand men withstood the repeated assaults of four different brigades, consisting of nineteen regiments and four batteries.

Full two-thirds of their mounted officers were unhorsed, and most of the regiments lost their organization, and were not re-united until at Corinth several days after.

Between two fields, a quarter of a mile apart, on a slight ridge of land covered by good sized oaks, and in places patches of dense brush, lies this historical spot, that was made rich by the blood of many hundred human beings.

Passing through the woods, and connecting these fields, was an unused road; washed down in places by the rains of scores of years, it served the Union forces as a miniature breastworks, and is known in our reports and accounts by the oft-used term, "The Old Washed-Out Road."

At 9 a. m. Tuttle's Iowa brigade reached this position, and he placed the 12th Iowa, Col. Woods, and 14th Iowa, Col. Shaw, in the old road; the 12th on the right, extending slightly into the field Maj. Cavender placed Welker's First Missouri Battery in the centre of 12th Iowa.

What fragments Prentiss had saved of his command from the sudden onslaught of such superior numbers, he placed in position on the left end of this road, reaching to Peach Orchard field, leaving a gap between himself and Tuttle,—which was soon filled by the 8th Iowa, Col. Geddes, of Sweeny's brigade. Munch's battery, of Prentiss's, had lost four of its guns, and Hickenlooper had lost two. Prentiss placed Munch on the left of 14th Iowa, and Hickenlooper's in the centre of his own command.

At 9:30, the Confederates, under Hindman, commenced the assault in connection with Gladden's brigade, followed later by Gibson's and Patton Anderson's brigades. These assaults are so graphically described in Col. Wm. Preston Johnston's life of his father, that we quote it:

"And now both armies were in the tumult of mortal endeavor. The Confederate assaults were made by rapid and often unconnected charges along the line. They were repeatedly checked, and often repulsed, by the stubborn resistance of the assailed. Sometimes counter-charges drove them back for short distances; but, whether in assault or recoil, both sides saw their bravest soldiers fall in frightful numbers. Over the blue-clad lines of the Federal troops floated the 'Stars and Stripes,' endeared to them by the traditions of three-quarters of a century. The Confederates came on in motley garb, varying from the favorite gray and domestic 'butternut,' to the blue of certain Louisiana regiments, which paid so dearly the penalty of doubtful colors. Over them were flags and pennons, as various as their uniforms.

"Polk and Bragg, meeting about half-past ten o'clock, agreed that Polk should direct the left centre, where part of his corps was grouped, and that Bragg should take command to his right. Bragg says:

"Here we met the most obstinate resistance of the day, the enemy being strongly posted with infantry and artillery on an eminence behind a dense thicket. Hindman's command was gallantly led to the attack, but recoiled under a murderous fire.

"Hindman himself was severely wounded by the explosion of a shell, and borne from the field. A. P. Stewart then took command of Hindman's brigade, with his own.

"This position of the Federals was occupied by Wallace's division, and per-

80357 foldout in detached map drawer

haps by the remains of Prentiss's and other commands. Here, behind a dense thicket on the crest of a hill, was posted a strong force of as hardy troops as ever fought, almost perfectly protected by the conformation of the ground, and by logs and other rude and hastily-prepared defenses. To assail it an open field had to be passed, enfiladed by the fire of its batteries. It was nicknamed by the Confederates, by a very mild metaphor, 'The Hornet's Nest.' No figure of speech would be too strong to express the deadly peril of assault upon this natural fortress, whose inaccessible barriers blazed for six hours with sheets of flame, and whose infernal gates poured forth a murderous storm of shot and shell and musket-fire which no living thing could quell or even withstand. Brigade after brigade was led against it. But valor was of no avail. Hindman's brilliant brigades, which had swept everything before them from the field, were shivered into fragments in the shock of the assault, and paralyzed for the remainder of the day. A. P. Stewart's regiments made fruitless assaults, but only to retire mangled and disheartened.

"Bragg now ordered up Gibson's splendid brigade, composed of the First Arkansas, Fourth, Thirteenth and Nineteenth Louisiana, which moved forward with alacrity. Gibson himself, a knightly soldier, as gentle and courteous as he was unflinching, was aided by colonels three of whom afterward became generals. The brigade made a gallant charge, but, like the others, recoiled from the fire it encountered. A blaze of musketry swept through it from front and flank; powerful batteries also opening upon its left. Under this cross-fire it at last fell back with very heavy loss. Allen's Fourth Louisiana was dreadfully cut up in this charge, and suffered some confusion from a misapprehension that it was fired upon by friends. Gibson asked for artillery to be sent him; but it was not at hand, and Bragg sent orders to charge again. The colonels thought it hopeless; but Gibson led them again to the attack, and they again suffered a bloody repulse.

"Gibson, who, assisted by Allen and Avegno, had been leading the Fourth and Thirteenth Louisiana in the first two assaults, learning from the adjutant of Fagan that the regiments on the right had suffered equal disaster, turned over the command of his left wing to Colonel Allen, with directions to execute the orders received from General Bragg. He then proceeded to the right, and helped Fagan to lead the magnificent First Arkansas again to the assault.

"Four times the position was charged; four times the assault proved unavailing." The brigade was repulsed; but maintained its ground steadily, until Wallace's position was turned, when, again renewing its forward movement in conjunction with Cheatham's command, it helped to drive back its stout opponents. Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, of the Frist Arkansas, fell pierced with seven balls. Two of its captains were killed; the major, a captain, and many officers, wounded. In the Fourth Louisiana, Colonel Allen was wounded, and three captains and three lieutenants killed or wounded. Gibson's entire staff was disabled, and his assistant adjutant-general, Lieutenant Ben King, killed. When Gibson went to Fagan, Allen, a very fearless soldier, wrung at his unavailing loss, rode back to General Bragg to repeat the need of artillery, and to ask him if he must charge again. Bragg, impatient at the check, hastily replied, "Colonel Allen, I want no faltering now." Allen, stung by the reply, said not a word, but, going back to his command, and waving his sword for his men to follow, charged once more—but again in vain. He never forgave Bragg, and the brigade thought they got hard measure in Bragg's orders and in his report.

"Patton Anderson's brigade, with the Crescent Regiment, of Pond's brigade, and aided by a regiment, two battalions, and a battery from Trabue's brigade, was eventually more successful farther to the left. His ground also was very difficult, but he caught the enemy more on the flank, and clung to it, rattling them with musketry and artillery, until the movement of the Confederate right broke into this citadel, when he carried his point. But this was not until after hours of manœvering and heavy skirmishing, with great loss, and after the enemy's left was turned. The Twentieth Louisiana was badly cut up in the underbrush, and in other regiments many companies lost all their officers.

The above article is undoubtedly correct, excepting that there were no

"ravines" in this vicinity, and the "natural fortress and inaccessible barriers," were the solid lines of Federal infantry and artillery, who never flinched, but taking good aim at the right time, mowed down their brave opponents, throwing them into disorder and rout.

Gen. Grant met Gen. Prentiss about 3 o'clock, and as this part of the line was the key to the situation, he asked him to hold it until dark, if possible, but at 4:30 o'clock the rest of our lines had been driven in, thus flanking this position, and compelling this little band of Spartans to about-face, and endeavor to cut their way to the Landing, but being confronted by superior numbers, and in want of ammunition, they were forced to surrender, with no discredit to a soul of them.

BATTLE OF SHILOH.

WRITTEN EXPRESSLY FOR THIS WORK BY L. B. CROOKER, LATE CAPTAIN 55TH ILLINOIS INFANTRY.

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburgh Landing, was one of the bloodiest in the annals of this continent. In all the sanguinary contests of our late war, it was, for those who stayed at the front, one of the most terrific.

The Comte de Paris, in his very able history of the Rebellion, quotes Gen. Sherman as saying that it was the most terrible he had witnessed during his career. Badeau, in his "Life of Gen. Grant," speaks of it as embracing several hours of as desperate fighting as was ever seen on this continent. He again refers to it by saying that "it was the severest fight of the war west of the Alleghanies, and in proportion to the numbers engaged equaled any contest during the rebellion." He further quotes Gen. Sherman as saying that he never saw such terrible fighting afterwards, and that Gen. Grant compared Shiloh only to the "Wilderness."

The several very able works and reports of Confederate writers give further testimony of the bloody character of this early contest on the banks of the Tennessee.

Of that part of Grant's army actually engaged on the first day, fully thirty per cent were killed and wounded—a loss almost unprecedented in the annals of war. Speaking of killed and wounded alone, the loss on the Union side was greater than during the historic "seven days' fight," including Malvern Hill, Savage Station, Gaines Mill, etc.

More than twice as many Union soldiers were struck with Confederate bullets at Shiloh as at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks combined. The ratio of casualties at Shiloh almost doubles that of the "butcher's bill" at Gettysburg, and fifteen fewer patriots lie in that cemetery, where "the waves of secession reached high water mark," than sleep their last sleep at Pittsburgh Landing.

These same men, hid away in the wilds of Tennessee, suffered in one day's battle a per cent. of loss equal to that of the entire Atlanta campaign, extending over more than four months' time. All of these operations embraced armies twice or three times as large as that of Gen. Grant at Shiloh. More young men were mangled by the missiles of war in this single battle than there were citizens of like age in the city of Chicago at that time.

It was the first great field fight of the war. It was a death grapple of the western men of the western continent. The magnitude of the conflict at once became apparent, and rebellion stood forth in all its gigantic reality From that hour all sentimental talk of an easy conquest ceased upon both sides.

In the autumn of 1861, the Confederate line in the west extended from Columbus, Ky., on the left to Bowling Green on the right. This line was intersected near its center by the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, defended respectively by Forts Henry and Donelson. All eyes were turned toward Columbus, the "Gibraltar of the West," which protected the rebel left flank on the Mississippi. The literature of the period clearly indicated that as the point of attack.

Suddenly out of the clouds of doubt and gloom surrounding the actions of the Union armies came the glad tidings that Gen. Grant had attacked the Confederate line in the center, and by the channels of the Tennessee and Cumberland, and that Forts Henry and Donelson had been captured.

Much discussion has taken place as to who originated this line of operations. Gen. Sherman seems to give Gen. Halleck the credit. The dispatches

of Gen. Grant show at least an early appreciation, on his part, of the propriety of this line of attack, and they further show a much greater readiness to proceed in that direction than his superiors were at first willing to allow. It is probable, however, that so simple a problem had attracted the attention of many military men on both sides.

These events were extremely rich in results. They embraced the capture and occupation of Forts Henry and Donelson, Nashville, Columbus, and Bowling Green, with contiguous and intervening territory. Great losses of material and men resulted to the Confederates, while the moral effect was of extraordinary value to the loyal North.

The next step in this sweep of grand strategy culminated in the great battle of Shiloh. In the line assumed by the Confederates after the fall of Donelson, Corinth became a point of the first importance. The events just mentioned had broken the Confederate center, and their commander, Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, conceived and executed the brilliant strategic movement of concentrating his whole force at Corinth.

The natural and obvious way for the Federal army to attack this portion of the Confederacy was to continue the line nature had marked, by the channel of the Tennessee river, so that all the advantages of navigation, safe communication and naval protection could be secured. Concentration on their part was also undertaken, and the larger part of Buell's army was ordered from the Nashville line westward to join Gen. Grant's army, preparatory to an advance on Corinth, and a considerable portion of it arrived in time to take part in the various stages of the second day's conflict at Shiloh.

The particular point selected for the rendezvous of Gen. Grant's army, pending this concentration, was Pittsburgh Landing, upon the same side of the Tennessee river and about twenty miles from Corinth. The selection of this place, fortunate or unfortunate, was the act of Gen. Charles F. Smith, a very competent soldier, temporarily in command during the short suspension of Gen. Grant.

There is nothing in the reports and dispatches of the period indicating that any Federal commander on the ground contemplated the possibility of a Confederate attack before concentration and organization were completed. On the contrary, contemporaneous literature and events incontestably lead to the conclusion that the Federal commanders expected to complete the consolidation of their forces and seek the Confederates at or near Corinth.

Pittsburgh Landing was selected as the point because it was convenient, because the ground was high, and because its roads and ridges leading into the interior furnished good and sufficient camping grounds.

While Gen. Grant's army was so situated, having been somewhat re-enforced by new regiments, but before any part of Buell's army had arrived, it was attacked early Sunday morning of April 6, 1862, by the entire Confederate army. This onslaught by the Confederates had all the advantages and reaped many of the fruits of an entire lack of expectancy and preparation on the part of the Federal commander.

Thus simple were the facts which led to this terrible "test of manhood." No adequate understanding of this battle can be had without an allusion to the topography of the field, now and forever to be historical.

It is embraced within the borders of Lick creek on the south and Snake creek on the north, which enter the Tennessee river on nearly parallel lines about four miles apart, and from the general direction of southwest. Up stream a short distance from the mouth of Snake creek, Owl creek enters it from the side of the battle-field and becomes the boundary of the battle-field upon the Union right flank.

The battle was fought upon the high plateau between these creeks. This plateau or ridge is cut up by innumerable ravines and small creeks, at times dry, tributary to the larger creeks or the river. Those emptying into Lick creek and into the river below it, are terribly deep and rugged, but quickly terminate towards their upper end and blend into the more general level of the center of the battle-field.

The sweep of the Confederate line of attack was down this plateau in the

general direction of northeast. Their line of battle reached from Owl creek on their left to, or nearly to, Lick creek on their right.

On this bright Sunday morning, as the Confederate hosts stood, grim and earnest, in serried lines awaiting the order to spring to the attack, they numbered somewhat more than forty thousand men—as brave men as were ever offered to the God of war, as earnest men as though the cause for which they fought was just, as willing as though the dogma of secession was a living and righteous principle. They had spent three full days in floundering through the mud and forests seventeen miles, and though much delayed, and disappointed at such delay, they were finally in line for the fatal rush. They were formed in three lines of battle, commanded respectively from front to rear by Gens. Hardee, Bragg and Polk, with a reserve commanded by Gen. Breckenridge.

All this force was commanded by Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, who had the full confidence of his superiors. This general possessed at that time a more varied experience in war than any man on this continent. His command in the West had suffered serious reverses, which had brought upon him an unreasoning and overwhelming degree of abuse. But now, when the war clouds have cleared away, it is hard to see how he could have done better under the circumstances. It is safe to say that when history is finally and calmly written it will award him a high place as to personal character and ability. He had that anomalous military appendage, a second in command, in the person of Gen. Beauregard, whose position in history is as anomalous now as his command was then.

It now becomes essential to examine the location and condition of the Federal army, lounging unsuspiciously in front of this great host. This army consisted of six divisions, commanded respectively by Gens. McClernand, W. H. L. Wallace, Lew Wallace, Hurlburt, Sherman and Prentiss. Gen. W. H. L. Wallace commanded the second division by a recent assignment, its regular commander, Gen. C. F. Smith, being then at Savanna, disabled by an accident which resulted in his death a few weeks later.

All these were under the chief command of Gen. U. S. Grant, whose transcendent military genius finally led us to victory.

Truth requires it to be said that his faults—principally of omission—were great in this campaign, yet, after the battle had commenced, many of the characteristics which give him his place in history, shone out brightly, and finally resulted in rescuing victory from defeat.

The blame, if properly distributed, would fall largely upon subordinates, but with the imperturbable, grim silence which formed so marked a trait of his character, he bore it all without a word. When night had finally closed in upon this flaming war picture, Gen. Grant had completed his military education, and was fully equipped to become the champion of human liberty.

The front line of the Union army, so far as it was a line, was situated as follows: On the right was McDowell's brigade, resting near Owl creek. Next, to the left, a quarter of a mile distant across a heavy ravine, came Buckland's brigade, resting its left upon Shiloh Church. Hildebrand's brigade came next, forming its right at the church, but with its left regiment, the 53d Ohio, detached from the rest of the brigade and located across a ravine, some two hundred yards distant. These were of Sherman's division.

To the left and front of these three brigades and from three-eighths to one-half a mile away, we find Prentiss's raw division encamped. The interval between him and Sherman was considerably increased by the advance of his line immediately before the moment of attack.

To the left and rear of Prentiss's brigade, and fully three-quarters of a mile distant stood an isolated brigade commanded by Stuart, belonging nominally to Sherman's division. It was so located, ostensibly for the purpose of covering the crossing of Hamburg road over Lick creek. As a matter of fact, however, it was more than half a mile away from the crossing, and the highest ridge upon the battle-field lay between. There was also more than half a mile of territory unoccupied between Stuart's left and the river.

A route touching the various positions just described would be circuitous, and a much greater distance than a direct line from Owl creek to Lick creek or

to the river. It will be readily perceived that less than one-half of this front was actually occupied by troops. In the unforeseen and overwhelming attack that followed, all these unoccupied spaces became points of danger, through which the Confederate hosts poured, and immediately flanked every separate body of Federal troops.

All of these troops were raw and green. Not one regiment had, as yet, been under fire. Prentiss's brigade organizations were not yet completed. Many of the regiments had just arrived. Some were still arriving. Some of the troops received their ammunition only the day before the battle, and one regiment, when the battle opened had no ammunition at all.

Considerably more than one mile in Prentiss's rear, Hurlburt's division was camped. To the left and rear of Sherman, a half a mile or more, lay McClernand's division. More than two miles to the rear of the front line and to the west and rear of the Landing, Gen. W. H. L. Wallace's division was located. Gen. Lew Wallace's division was at Crump's Landing, six or seven miles down the river, his three brigades stretching inland toward Purdy, more than three miles. The artillery and the cavalry were at various places, in a state of unrestful commotion, seeking their new positions under an order for re-assignment issued but two days before. Precision in camping was not exacted, and in many instances, convenience more than correct alignment determined the location of the different bodies of troops. All the veteran troops belonging to the army were located from one to eight miles in the rear of the front line.

The two flanks of the army could not have been better protected than they were, by the waters and marshes of Lick and Owl creeks. The flanks of its different sections could not have been more exposed than they were, by the nature of the ground and lack of continuity.

No attempt was made to construct defensive works, although the ground and timber were admirably adapted to that purpose. Such details hardly as yet belonged to the domain of field operations, and no presentiment existed that they would be needed. Ordinary means of human knowledge had not been used to test such a question, and nothing providential occurred to make it known.

The attack came so suddenly, and with so little warning, that these gaps along the front could not be filled with troops from the rear. A solid, continuous Confederate line met a disintegrated and fragmentary Federal line, and the inevitable followed.

Herein is found the matter and the manner—the substance and the shadow of the "surprise" at Shiloh.

Such was the position and environment of the Union army as the great hour of its trial approached. It numbered, when stripped for battle, from 32,000 to 33,000 stalwart men. They were there—albeit unconscious at the time—uncrowned heroes, sufficient obstacles in the way of secession.

So these armies faced each other; the one wrong believing they were right, the other right, *knowing* they were right.

As the sun lingered below the horizon, as if unwilling to look upon the impending fratricidal struggle, they sought each other out, and the harvest of death commenced.

That which follows is a mere outline of that struggle.

Three companies of the 25th Missouri had been early sent out by Prentiss to reconnoitre, and, owing to the direction taken, had met the enemy's pickets in front of Sherman's division. Confederate staff officers report the time of this firing to be fourteen minutes past five o'clock. Orders to attack were at once sent along the Confederate line, and Prentiss's advance, though re-enforced and fighting well, was soon driven back.

The enemy had no accurate knowledge of the precise position of the Union lines, and the ground was obscured by deep ravines and dense thickets. The line of attack, therefore, did not strike the defensive line squarely, but moved obliquely by Sherman's right and front. It first fell upon Prentiss, and was immediately followed by an assault upon Sherman's left. Thus in the main shock, the Federal center and right center were the first points of contact.

Gen. Sherman, going towards the firing, saw the Confederate masses sweep-

ing obliquely by, towards his left, and his Orderly was killed by the rebel skirmishers. Here, as this great historical page was unfolding, he seems to have been first convinced of its bloody import, for his report says that he then "became, for the first time, satisfied, that the enemy designed a determined attack." Sherman's left regiment, the 53d Ohio, soon went to pieces, being twice ordered from the field by its cowardly Colonel, although the subordinate officers tried to overcome this demoralization. Gaps in the Confederate line were filled from the rear as fast as they occurred, and its unity was thus preserved throughout. The flanks of the Federal detachments along Sherman's and Prentiss's fronts were quickly enveloped Regiments and parts of regiments soon began to crumble away, not always to rally in the rear. Withers's division was brought up on Hardee's right, and one of its brigades (Gladden's), hurled headlong to the attack. Its commander was killed and shortly afterward its two subsequent commanders were wounded.

Jackson and Chalmers enveloped Prentiss's left, and Hindman his right. Hildebrand's brigade to the left of Shiloh Church soon became disintegrated, although its commander did all possible to hold it.

To the right of Shiloh Church, that man of wrath, Cleburne, plunged through the boggy valley of Oak creek and up the slope squarely at Buckland's brigade. On his men struggled only to be met and hurled back with terrible slaughter. More than one-third of his men fell in this short struggle, the 6th Mississippi losing three hundred killed and wounded out of four hundred and twenty-five engaged. Buckland's rear soon became exposed through the falling back of Hildebrand's men.

One of McClernand's brigades, in the vain effort to stem the torrent of Confederates pouring through the open space between Prentiss and Sherman, was driven back and its commander, the brave Col. Raith, mortally wounded.

By this time the rebel line had been largely re-enforced from the rear, and wherever the links in the Federal line were weak or missing, instant advantage was taken of it. McClernand had been notified to send forward help, as soon as Sherman had reasoned out the problem that a serious attack and not merely a reconnoissance was intended, and he took part whenever and wherever occasion offered. Certainly Gen. McClernand did his full duty. Generally a brigade or a regiment started for the front and, when the Confederates were met, a deadly conflict ensued, no opportunity offering for combined movements.

Gen. Sherman, at this time, at least, was the conspicuous hero of the occasion. His conduct is said to have been magnificent, and all that could have been done to stem the torrent by one human being was done by him. His place in history as a strategist and a great general is safe, but his personal genius and presence never impressed itself so entirely upon and became a part of the details of a promiscuous battle, as upon this occasion.

The Confederate left did not reach far enough to the Federal right to encounter McDowell's brigade, which, for a time, took no part in the conflict, suffering the usual disadvantage of a defensive line in a blind forest, of not knowing when and where it was most needed.

Finally, at ten o'clock, Gen. Sherman ordered a new line to be established along the Purdy road, in the rear. With McClernand's men, and arrivals from W. H. L. Wallace's division, he fought through the day, from point to point, until toward evening he found himself, with a mixed and depleted command, over two miles to the rear of his first position, and on a line with the Landing.

Further to the left, meanwhile, the battle had also gone against Prentiss. As often as any portion of his men made a stand, they were flanked, and so were pushed back from point to point, about half way to the Landing, and in the vicinity of the celebrated "Hornet's Nest."

Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, after the Federal right and center, under Prentiss and Sherman, had been started toward the rear, being satisfied with the progress of the battle in that quarter, turned his attention toward the Federal left. As Prentiss's left had been driven from its position in the rear of its camp, he appeared on that portion of the field, and, stopping Chalmers's and Jackson's brigades in their onward career, filed them to the rear until across a tributary to

Lick creek, when he conducted them, with Girady's and Gage's battery, eastward over the high bluffs, and put them in position opposite the isolated position of Stuart.

Here were, without artillery, three regiments formed, awaiting the expected attack, but uncertain of its direction. After organizing this attack, Gen. Johnston went further toward the center of the field, where in a few hours he received his death wound. To the right of Stuart, but out of sight, were the 9th and 12th Illinois, under McArthur, who had been dispatched to the support of Stuart. As they were proceeding along, or in the vicinity of the Hamburg road, they were met by hostile troops, and went bravely to work. During the encounter, one of the bloodiest on the field, the 9th Illinois suffered the greatest loss in killed and wounded of any Federal regiments during the battle.

Various and partial attacks were pushed upon Stuart, during which the 71st Ohio, the largest regiment in his brigade, fled to the Landing, its Colonel leading, and its Lieutenant-Colonel being killed in the vain attempt to rally it.

Stuart, in search of a position, fell back to a deep, rugged ravine, about three hundred yards to the left and rear of his camps, and carried on a gallant fight with the eight hundred remaining men of his brigade. After maintaining his position until after two o'clock, and leaving half his men killed or wounded at this ravine, and being out of ammunition, he retreated to the right and rear, and toward evening took his place in line with other troops near the Landing. During this conflict the 55th Illinois lost the greatest number in killed and wounded of any Federal regiment during the battle, excepting the 9th Illinois.

Hurlburt's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions had come into the fight at various times and in various positions, Wallace mainly in the center and Hurlburt mainly to the left. Brigades, and, in some instances, single regiments, had been detached and sent where some exigency demanded. Two of Hurlburt's brigades advanced to the support of the left center, and met the débris of Prentiss's broken division. They entered the fight with spirit, and were well handled. His right was, for the most part, attached to the remnant of Prentiss's division, and his left occupied various positions, gradually swaying to the rear during the pulsations of the battle.

To the right of what remained of Prentiss's division, came Tuttle's brigade, and a portion of Sweeny's and Wallace's division, and, to the right of this, certain of McClernand's regiments. These men of Wallace's were the veterans of Donelson, well officered, and they had deliberately marched to that position from the rear, and had suffered none of the demoralizing effects of a sudden attack.

Hurlburt's left was stubborn, and about half-past two in the afternoon, Gen. Albert Sydney Johnston, while leading a somewhat unwilling Tennessee brigade, received his death wound, it is said at the hands of either the 32d or 41st Illinois. This assault threw Hurlburt's left further to the rear, until the Federal line assumed somewhat the form of an arch.

In the hours that followed, this became the key to the battle, around and upon which the hopes of an actual and a possible nation clung in doubt.

Its left was composed of Hurlburt's battered regiments, its center or apex, of the small remnant of Prentiss's division. Its right, of Tuttle's brigade, which, as yet, had suffered small loss. On both the right and left, and probably at intervals, were certain accretions from the battle-field which cannot be named as organizations,—all, however, striving manfully for the cause.

It had been welded together by the heat of battle, and embraced, at that time, no skulkers. Many of the best batteries in the army were in this line. The choice men of Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, Wisconsin and Kentucky were there. Hundreds of brave men floating from the débris of the battle-field, fell in here and there, contented with a chance to fight and die.

Such generals as Grant, Wallace, Hurlburt, Prentiss and Tuttle, directed and participated in its honors and horrors. Grim old Col. Shaw, the yet unCrowned McPherson, and hundreds of equally brave subordinates, helped bear the burden of the hour. Privates (they should be named first), corporals, ser-

geants, lieutenants, captains, field officers and generals,—all were acknowledged heroes, not by brevet, but by divine appointment.

As the life blood of Albert Sidney Johnston bubbled away, "the strong arm that had drawn the bow" grew nerveless. The great nerve center of the Confederate army ceased to send its mandates to the extremities, and a lull followed. Shortly such men as Bragg, Hardee, Breckenridge and Polk, gathered up the reins, and the fiery chariot rolled on. Troops were gathered from other portions of the field. Fragments were put in charge of whomsoever had courage to lead. Battery after battery was concentrated, and for a time the events of this great battle centered in this vortex.

Finally, at three o'clock, Hurlburt received word that Stuart had been driven in, and his battered brigades, after doing everything possible to withstand the shock of the re-enforced Confederate right, were withdrawn to the Landing, sadly depleted, but with organizations yet complete. Then Prentiss's fragments became the extreme left of the line.

Jackson and Chalmers, after resting from their bloody conflict with Stuart, came this way. Delayed for a short time in a fortuitous but desperate combat with the 57th Illinois, they soon enveloped Prentiss's left, and took his line in reverse. The latter, refusing his line, step by step his men swung around like a door on its hinges, and fought faced to the rear, back to back with Wallace's men.

Further to the right of the line, also, the Confederates came charging down. Polk's men began to get around it and between it and the Landing. Seeing that the position was no longer tenable, Wallace went to his right and commenced to file his columns to the rear. While leading them, and sitting upon his horse, a bullet hit him in the temple, and he fell dying to the ground. No better citizen or soldier fell upon the field that day.

As this column was making its way to the rear, a fierce assault of Polk's men pierced it, and that portion cut off were enclosed with Prentiss, and, surrounded on all sides, they surrendered, but without loss of honor.

The captures on this portion of the field numbered nearly two thousand men. It is commonly called the "surrender of Prentiss." True that general was captured on that part of the field, but by far the larger number of captures were from Tuttle's brigade of Wallace's division. It is doubtful if Prentiss had fifteen hundred of his division in hand after ten o'clock in the morning.

One of the myths which have clung to the literature of this battle, is that Prentiss surrendered sometime before noon. This is entirely unjust to that commander. No doubt exists that such surrender occurred after half past four in the afternoon. That his division disintegraded early in the day is true, but under circumstances not discreditable to himself or even to the men. His conduct was characterized by great bravery, and leaves no reproach.

The events just related ended the conflict in the center, called by the Confederates, the "Hornet's Nest." For some hours it was the turning point in the battle, and beyond doubt saved what was finally saved of the first day's wreck at Shiloh. It gave time to gather and organize a sufficient force in the rear,—to plant batteries and take breath.

The Confederates, exhausted by the hours of struggle, and depleted by the casualties of battle, demoralized by lack of discipline, and plunder of camps, lingered about the place of surrender and captured camps for some time—moments of precious respite for the defenders of the Union.

Col. Webster placed large guns in position, and all artillery in hand was placed where it would do the most good. All complete organizations were placed in line. Numbers of waifs from the battle-field fell in. Just as the shades of evening began to gather, the strong tread of one of Buell's brigades came up the hill at the Landing, and formed on the left.

Finally, the Confederates concentrated about the place of surrender, made some attempt at deployment, and a spasmodic and disjointed attack was attempted upon the last Federal position, on a line with the Landing. They were easily repelled, and the Confederates withdrew to bivouac at various places in their rear.

Darkness threw its mantle over the blood-stained field. The living and

unhurt sought rest as best they could, to await the call for battle on the morrow. The wounded lay scattered over the field, writhing in anguish. The dead were quietly at rest, suffering neither fear nor pain.

The two Federal gunboats had been for some hours firing blindly into the woods and up the ravines from the river, and through the night added their sullen roar to the thunder-storm which had burst over the field.

During all these events, the Federal army had fought step by step from its first lines to its present position, and had received no aid from Gen. Lew Wallace's division. As night closed in, such division arrived and took its position in the rear of the right. Certain it is, that Wallace had received early notice to be ready, and through the day repeated orders to march to the field. All his marches and countermarches, however, did not bring him upon the scene during the first day. All the published comments, his own included, fail to afford a satisfactory solution. The bald fact remains, that although so ordered he did not during a whole day get into the battle, only six miles distant. His men, if left to their own instincts, would have reached the battle-field sooner on their hands and knees.

During the night Buell's army kept arriving. By morning nearly twenty thousand of them were in line—seasoned, hardy and brave troops of the Army of the Cumberland.

Much speculation has ensued as to what would have been the result if such re-enforcements had not arrived. A full survey of the facts warrants this conclusion: that during the next day, or any number of days, the Confederate army, in its exhausted condition, could not have driven the Federal army from its last position.

Neither could the Federal army, without the aid of Buell, have assumed the offensive on Monday morning with any hope of success. It is idle to speculate as to what Gen. Grant intended to do without such re-enforcements, because he knew they were at hand and all his arrangements were made in view of that fact.

It may be well here to allude to the last line of the Federal army on Sunday evening. It was not, as is often understood, a promiscuous mass of troops huddled in a semi-circle around the Landing. It was a well-ordered, compact line of desperate and brave men at right angles with the river, on which its left rested, and reaching fully a mile west, with Gen. Lew Wallace's fresh division close at hand.

Its flanks were well protected; one of them covered by the gunboats and siege guns, the other by Owl creek. All known facts lead to the conclusion that it was the only complete, compact Federal line of battle formed that day, with both flanks fully protected and no breaks along its front.

From this position it could not have been pushed by any Confederate force at hand. If the remains of Gen. Grant's army, re-enforced by Gen. Lew Wallace's division and twenty thousand men from the Army of the Cumberland, required until four o'clock in the afternoon of the second day to press the Confederate army two miles back to Shiloh Church, it is absurd to say that any successful advance could have been made without Buell's help.

How the battle was taken up the next day and carried to a successful conclusion, it is not the purpose of this article to follow. It was done, and well done. Again the flame of battle encompassed the field, and its fierce echoes reverberated through its ravines. The battle-scarred and storm-beaten but now veteran remnants of Grant s army vied with the divisions of McCook, Crittenden and Nelson in regaining the lost ground of Sunday.

Step by step the field was won, and ere the sun sank again to rest every camp was recovered.

The blue and the gray were buried by the victors, and the residuum of the routed, mangled and bleeding Confederate army dragged its weary way to Corinth.

More than a hundred thousand men had faced the flame of battle.

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

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

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

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CHARGE OF THE FIRST ARKANSAS CONFEDERATE INFANTRY IN THE "HORNET'S NEST."

"Bragg now ordered up Gen. Gibson's splendid brigade. He (Gen. Gibson) proceeded to the right, and helped Col. Fagan to lead his magnificent First Arkansas against the assault. Four times the position was charged; four times the assault proved unavailing. The brigade was repulsed," etc., etc.—LIFE OF GEN. ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSON, PAGE 605.

Col Fagan. Lt Col Thompson Gen Gibson Col Forrest